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Beatrice Foods: Meeting Competition
and Buyer Liability
Albert I. Borowitz
N EXPERIENCED antitrust practitioner' has observed that the
traditional allocation of Robinson-Patman responsibility be-
tween seller and buyer appears to have been influenced by the treat-
ment of kidnapping under the Imperial Chinese Codes. It seems
that kidnapping was rampant
in China until an ingenious
THE AUTHOR: ALBERT I. BoRowITz legislator solved the problem
(A.B., M.A., and LL.B., Harvard Uni- by making the payment of ran-
versity) is a member of the Ohio Bar and
a practicing attorney in Cleveland, som a capital offense.
Ohio. For years, the administra-
tion of the Robinson-Patman
Act' has followed a similar
pattern. Although the legislation was principally directed against
the anticompetitive effect of pressure by large buyers,3 the seller has
more often felt the bite of the statutory prohibitions than the buyer.
Two primary factors in this anomalous enforcement pattern have
been the Federal Trade Commission's (FTC) restrictive interpreta-
tion of the seller's meeting competition defense4 and the courts'
1 Stanley Freedman of Dayton, Ohio.
2 15 U.S.C. §§13, 13a-c, 21a (1964). The Robinson-Patman Act, enacted in 1936,
amended the original Clayton Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914).
3 See H.R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1936). These big-volume
direct buyers, mainly chain stores, did not, for instance,
employ the traditional middleman .... [They instead] bought directly from
the manufacturer. The chain store would, nonetheless, demand the standard
brokerage commission in the form of price reduction, and, because the manu-
facturer would otherwise pay it when dealing with wholesalers, it would be
given . . . by the manufacturer in order to placate a large-volume buyer.
This "price reduction" would be passed on to the consumer as a lower retail
price or used in advertising the retailer's goods. The independent retailer,
forced to use the old brokerage route, could not obtain such savings and meet
either the lower price or the increased advertising. E. KirtNER, A
ROBiNSON-PATMAN PRIMER 8-9 (1970).
4 Robinson-Patman Act § 2(b), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964). Section 2(b) provides
in part: "That nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-
facie case thus made by showing that his lower price ... was made in good faith to
meet an equally low price of a competitor...." In 1957, John W. Gwynne, at that
time chairman of the Federal Trade Commission, testified before a Senate committee
that the following were "reasonably well-established" standards concerning the meet-
ing competition defense:
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adoption of stringent standards of proof in imposing liability on
buyers for knowing inducement or receipt of prohibited discrimina-
tions.5 Although it may be premature to attribute great precedential
effect to Beatrice Foods Co.,6 in view of the diversity of conclusions
reached by the Commissioners and of the pending appeal of the.
Commission's decision to the Sixth Circuit,7 the case may mark an
important milestone in redressing the imbalance between seller and
buyer liability for negotiated price cuts.
The Beatrice rulings on meeting competition and buyer liability
did not, like Minerva, spring fully born and armed from the brow
of Jove, though many harried lawyers involved in pricing problems
may be willing to attribute a modicum of divine inspiration to at
least some aspects of the decision. It is well known that the Federal
Trade Commission was long hostile to the meeting competition de-
fense.8  After the Supreme Court held in Standard Oil Co. v. PTC
(1) The defense covers only situations where the prima fade proof of a dis-
crimination as defined in 2(a) has already been met....
(2) The defense is an affirmative one and the burden of establishing it is
upon the person daiming it ....
(3) The defense is good only where the reduction in price is to meet the lower
price of a competitor. It cannot be used to justify a price below that of a
competitor. The defense does not permit predatory price reductions to de-
stroy an individual competitor or the competition in a limited area ....
(4) The defense is good only in meeting individual competitive situations.
It cannot be used to justify discriminatory pricing systems based on some
vague theory of meeting competition generally....
(5) The defense can be used only in defensive situations, that is, to retain a
customer and not to gain a new one. While there is an area of disagreement
surrounding this premise, I believe that careful examination of the statutory
intent plus adjudication will bear this out....
(6) The competitor's price which the respondent was meeting must be a law-
ful price - or at least the seller as a reasonable and prudent man must be-
lieve it to be lawful. Here there is a real area of disagreement with cases point-
ing two directions ....
(7) The defense is good only when the lower price is given in good faith to
attain the limited objective prescribed by law. The defense does not permit
predatory price reductions to destroy an individual competitor or the competi-
tion in a limited area.... Cited in C. EDwARDS, THE PRicE DIScRIM.NATiON
LAW 550-51 (1959).
5 Robinson-Patman Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964). Section 2(f) provides
that "[ilt shall be unlawful for any person engaged in commerce, in the course of such
commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited
by this section."
See Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953). For a comprehensive list
of the standards that must be met to prove a violation of section 2(f), see E. KnNER,
supra note 3, at 252.
O [1967-1970 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,045 (FTC 1969).
7 Kroger Co. v. FTC, appeal docketed, No. 20233, 6th Cir., Feb. 19, 1970.
8 See note 4 supra.
9340 U.S. 231 (1951). Subsequently, the Supreme Court affirmed a ruling of the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which had held that the meeting comupeti-
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that, contrary to the Commission's contention, the meeting competi-
tion defense is an absolute defense to a charge of price discrimina-
tion, the Commission began to convert the statutory concept of good
faith into a number of inflexible prerequisites to the establishment
of the defense. The Commission held, for example, that the defense
can be used to retain customers but not to win new ones; 10 that a
seller can claim the defense to meet individual pricing situations but
not to match an overall pricing system; 1 that a seller can meet a
competitive offer with great precision but cannot legally "beat" it;12
that a seller must prove that he had no reason to believe that the
competitive prices being met were illegal.' 3 These substantive limi-
tations on the defense were accompanied by exacting evidentiary
standards with respect to verifying the existence and terms of com-
petitive offers. 4 Finally, after the courts of appeals had continually
rejected the Commission's restrictive glosses on the defense, the
Commission itself found the meeting competition defense to have
been successfully established in Continental Baking Co."5 and Ponca
Wholesale Mercantile Co. 6
don defense had been successfully established by Standard Oil, contrary to the FTC's
finding. FTC v. Standard Oil Co., 355 U.S. 396 (1958).
10 Sunshine Biscuits, Inc., 59 F.T.C. 674, 677, order set aside, 306 F.2d 48 (7th Cir.
1962).
11 Bigelow-Sanford Co., 64 F.T.C. 704 (1964), rev'd sub nom. Callaway Mills Co.
v. FTC, 362 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1966).
12 Forster Mfg. Co., 62 F.T.C. 852 (1963), order set aside, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
13 See, e.g., Standard Motor Products, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 832 (1957), aff'd, 265 F.2d 674
(2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959).
14 See, e.g., Forster Mfg. Co., 62 F.T.C. 852 (1963), order set aside, 335 F.2d 47
(1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965).
15 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 16,720 (FTC 1964). Indica-
tive of the Commission's departure in Continental Baking from its previously inflexible
approach to the meeting competition defense is its statement that the concept of good
faith is "flexible and pragmatic, not technical or doctrinaire. . . . [It] is simply the
standard of the prudent businessman responding fairly to what he reasonably believes
is a situation of the competitive necessity." Id. at 21,647. FTC v. A.X. Staley Mgf. Co.,
324 U.S. 746 (1945), is the fountainhead of the broad interpretation of the meaning
of good faith. See also Standard Oil Co. v. Brown, 238 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1956);
Balian Ice Cream Co. v. Arden Farms Co., 231 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1955).
16 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 16,814 (FTC 1964). The
following year, Beatrice Foods Co. itself was successful in establishing the meeting
competition defense. Beatrice Foods Co., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. 5 17,311 (FTC 1965) (sales to Miller's Supermarkets).
Many of the recent Commission decisions rejecting the defense, as well as appellate
decisions affirming such rejections, appear to be based more on insufficiency of factual
proof than on doctrinal limitations on the scope of the defense. See Viviano Macaroni
Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1969); Surprise Brassiere Co. v. FTC, 406 F.2d 711
(5th Cir. 1969); Knoll Associates, Inc., [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP.
5 17,668 (FTC 1966), reild on other grounds, 397 F.2d 530 (7th Cir. 1968); Tri Valley
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While the FTC has thus been relaxing the requirements of the
meeting competition defense, there has been an expansion in the
area of buyer liability. The buyer liability provisions 17 seemed to
have become almost a dead letter after the Supreme Court's 1953
decision in Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC.'8 This case imposed on
the FTC the burden of introducing evidence that the buyer had rea-
son, from trade experience or otherwise, to know that the price dis-
crimination was not legally justified by cost savings or other statu-
tory defenses. 9
But in the 1960's the buyer liability provisions came to life
again. Buyer liability was imposed in a series of group-buying cases
in the automotive parts industry, where retailers were found to have
banded together to claim a wholesaler's discount when they should
have known that competitive retailers whose operations were con-
ducted on a similar scale and in a similar manner were not receiving
such discounts.20 More significantly, buyer liability was imposed in
a number of cases involving head-to-head negotiations between buy-
er and seller. 2 ' These cases involved discrimination in promotional
Packing Ass'n, [1965-1967 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 5 17,657 (FTC 1966),
modified and aff'd sub nom. Tri Valley Growers v. FTC, 411 F.2d 985 (9th Cit. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 929 (1969), order modified, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,044 (FTC 1969); National Dairy Products Corp., [1965-1967
Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. g 17,656 (FTC 1966), af'd, 395 F.2d 517 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 977 (1968); Exquisite Form Brassiere Inc., 64 F.T.C. 271
(1964), affd, 360 F.2d 492 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
17 Robinson-Patman Act § 2(f), 15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1964).
18 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
29 In placing this burden on the FTC, the Court reasoned:
Added to the considerable burden that a seller himself may have in demon-
strating costs is the fact that the data not only are not in the buyer's hands
but are ordinarily obtainable even by the seller only after detailed investiga-
tion of the business. A subpoena of the seller's records is not likely to be
adequate .... Insistence on proof of costs by the buyer might thus have other
implications; it would almost inevitably require a degree of cooperation be-
tween buyer and seller, as against other buyers, that may offend other anti-
trust policies, and it might also expose the seller's cost secrets to the prejudice
of arm's-length bargaining in the future. Finally, not one but, as here, ap-
proximately 80 different sellers' costs may be in issue. Id. at 69.
2 0 See Alhambra Motor Parts v. FTC, 309 F.2d 213 (9th Cit. 1962); Mid-South
Distributors v. FTC, 287 F.2d 512 (5th Cit. 1961); American Motor Specialties Co.
v. FTC, 278 F.2d 225 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 884 (1960); National Parts
Warehouse, 63 F.T.C. 1692 (1964), afJ'd sub -nom. General Auto Supplies, Inc. v.
FTC, 346 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 382 U.S. 923 (1965). These cases were
reconciled with Automatic Canteen as falling within its examples of situations from
which the FTC could establish buyer knowledge.
21See R.-. Macy & Co. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1964); Giant Food, Inc.
v. FTC, 307 F.2d 184 (D.C. Cit. 1962); Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d
Cir. 1962); American News Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 104 (2d Cir. 1962). See also
Colonial Stores, Inc. [1967-1970 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. 5 19,248 (FTC
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allowances or services to which cost savings is no defense; therefore,
proof of the buyer's guilty knowledge turned on the simpler issue
of the nonavailability of similar benefits to other buyers. In Fred
Meyer, Inc. v. FTC,22 which involved price discrimination as well as
discrimination in promotional payments, the buyer's knowledge of
the absence of cost justification was inferred from both the exclu-
siveness of the reductions and the depth of the price cuts.
This, then, was the immediate legal background of the Beatrice
case - the beginning of a trend of expanded liability for price pres-
sure by buyers, accompanied by greater flexibility in examining the
good faith of sellers attempting to meet their competitors' offers.
The principal price reductions considered in Beatrice resulted from
the initiative of the buyer, Kroger, which, after handling brand
name dairy products of a number of suppliers in its Charleston Di-
vision, desired to change over to a program providing for its obtain-
ing such products from a single supplier on a private label basis.
Kroger also desired so-called "stripped service" in which the dairy
would deliver to Kroger's store platforms but would have no re-
sponsibility for inventory maintenance or other in-store services.
There was no possibility of several suppliers sharing the business;
the Commission characterized the bidding as "winner-take-all." ''
Kroger solicited bids for a private label program from four sup-
pliers: Broughton, Valley Bell, Fairmont, and Borden. Originally,
Beatrice was not approached by Kroger because Kroger's representa-
tive, Mr. Casserly, did not like the containers Beatrice was using;
however, when Beatrice learned that Kroger was seeking private
label milk, it assured Mr. Casserly that it could supply a satisfactory
container and joined in the bidding. The course of the negotiations
became one of the best documented bidding sessions of recent years.
Commissioner Jones, in her opinion for the majority, was clearly
impressed with the difficulties which Beatrice faced in determining
the terms of the competitive offers. First, Commissioner Jones
found that Mr. Casserly had untruthfully told Beatrice at the very
outset that Broughton had offered a discount of approximately 20
percent. On that ground, Mr. Casserly rejected Beatrice's initial
offer of 71 cents per gallon of milk. Beatrice then reduced its offer
May 7, 1970); Furr's, Inc., [1963-1965 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. 9 17,352
(FTC 1965).
22359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds, 390 U.S. 341 (1968).
23 Beatrice Foods Co., [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. a 19,045,
at 21,287 (FTC 1969).
MEETING COMPETITION; BUYER LIABILITY
to 68 cents to approximate a discount of 20 percent off list. This bid
was rejected by Mr. Casserly with the comment that the Fairmont bid
was better and that prices in one of the principal market areas were
deteriorating. When the Beatrice offer was subsequently reduced to
66 cents, the winning bid, Beatrice was told the bid was "compet-
itive;" but in fact Kroger considered it to be the best. Com-
missioner Jones summarized her view of Mr. Casserly's negotiating
performance by stating that "he failed to convey any correct infor-
mation about the price levels being quoted by others."
24
The second difficulty which Beatrice faced in the bidding was
that the various offers of the dairies were not comparable. They
covered a variety of products and extended over an indeterminate
period of time. The bases of the offers were different. One of the
Fairmont offers (about which Beatrice had only approximate infor-
mation) consisted of a series of discounts from list prices and a
television advertising program. Other offers, including the success-
ful Beatrice offer, were based on formulas utilizing raw milk costs
and other fixed cost factors, but the formulas were by no means the
same. The Beatrice formula produced a uniform price and was
based on average raw milk prices in the previous year under a sin-
gle Federal Milk Marketing Order. The Fairmont formula pro-
posal, which produced different area prices, was based on forecast
milk prices under three Federal Milk Marketing Orders plus un-
regulated costs in one area.
A majority of the Commission found that under these difficult
bidding circumstances Beatrice had established the good faith meet-
ing competition defense. The majority positions on meeting com-
petition which appear to hold the most significance for future Rob-
inson-Patman policy are the following:
1) The majority appeared to discard the technical approach to
the meeting competition defense in favor of an emphasis on a flexi-
ble, case-by-case standard of good faith. Commissioner Jones ob-
served: "The heart of the good faith defense is the subjective
attitude of the seller and his reasonable belief that his price offer is
no lower than is required under the circumstances."2 5 By stressing
the "subjective" nature of the statutory standard, the opinion goes
beyond the position taken by Commissioner Elman in Continental
24 Id. at 21,312. In the interest of fairness to the parties in this case, which is on
appeal at the time of this writing, it should be noted that the factual basis for the Com-
mission's conclusions about Mr. Casserly's untruthfulness in the negotiations is very
much in dispute.
251d. at 21,307.
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Baking Co.,26 where he reserved the question whether an objective
or subjective standard of good faith was imposed.2 7  It is hoped that
this return to the generalized statutory standard, whether or not
a subjective standard, will continue and will be accompanied by the
gradual demise of the rigid rules which have become encrusted upon
the statutory language.2 8
2) Commissioner Jones acknowledged that the Beatrice bid
"beat" the opposition in that it was considered the best bid by Kro-
ger. This fact did not defeat Beatrice's defense, however, since the
record clearly showed that Beatrice did everything in its power,
through investigations and testing of rumors, to find the right price
level.
3) The majority was content to pass on the sufficiency of Beat-
rice's investigation as a whole to establish its good faith, without
laying down any rigid evidentiary requirements for proof of knowl-
edge of competitive terms. Such rigid requirements have sometimes
been the rule in Commission proceedings.29  There is no room in
the delicate regulation of a competitive system for best evidence
rules. Certainly the best evidence of a competitor's terms is confir-
mation from the competitor himself. But the exchange between
competing sellers of price information about past transactions was
held violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act ° in United States v.
Container Corp.8 In Di-Wal, Inc. v. Fibreboard Corp.,3 2 however, a
district court, sitting as the trier of facts, recently blessed price infor-
mation exchanges between competitors on the ground that they had
been made to assist competitors in complying with the good faith re-
quirements of the Robinson-Patman Act. Reliance on Di-Wal, risky
to say the least, will be unnecessary if the flexible evidentiary ap-
proach taken by Beatrice continues.
4) The majority appeared to authorize a response to an overall
competitive situation rather than requiring a dose imitation of
terms. This attitude is illustrated by Commissioner Jones' apparent
26 [1963-1965 Transfer Binder) TRADE REG. REP. 5 16,720 (FTC 1964).
27Id. at 21,647.
2 8 See text accompanying notes 10-13 supra.
2 9 See, e.g., Standard Motor Products, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 814 (1957), afl'd, 265 F.2d
674 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959).
80 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
3' 393 U.S. 333 (1969). The Court found that the exchange of price information
tended to stabilize prices. This was held to be a form of price-fixing, a per se violation
of the Sherman Act. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 223
(1940).
32 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970 Trade Cas.) 5 73,155 (N.D. Cal. April 17, 1970).
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approval of Beatrice's comparing its price cut with a whole bundle
of benefits offered by Fairmont. This Fairmont bundle included a
cooperative advertising program, which under a more technical stat-
utory analysis might have required a response through the grant of
promotional services or allowances. It would be risky, however, to
expect this flexible treatment of competitive response outside of a
factual setting such as that in the Beatrice bidding situation, in
which comparison of the competitors' pricing programs was very dif-
ficult. For example, where an industry regularly prices on the basis
of list prices less established discounts and products are comparable,
it would be dangerous to assume that Beatrice authorizes the meet-
ing of an advertising allowance by a price cut.
5) Beatrice was found not answerable for the untruthfulness of
Mr. Casserly since the record revealed no reason to disbelieve him.
Moreover, Beatrice was absolved from responsibility for responding
to buyer pressure. Commissioner Jones wrote:
If businessmen are not to be prohibited entirely from bargaining in
such a situation, the burden of not exceeding Robinson-Patman
bounds should, at some point, fall on the buyer who plays the cards
so dose to his vest as to persuade the seller to come down just a little
more, and not on the seller who has tried by every proper means to
feel out the opposition.33
Turning to the issue of buyer liability, the majority reversed the
hearing examiner and found that Kroger had violated section 2 (f) 34
by knowing inducement and receipt of a price discrimination. In
finding the buyer liable, the majority rejected the argument that
since section 2(f) applies only to inducement or receipt of a pro-
hibited discrimination, it cannot be violated when the discrimination
is justified by the seller under the meeting competition defense.
Commissioner Jones did not address herself to this problem arising
from the statutory language. She acknowledged that "undoubtedly
a buyer can accept an offer made to meet competition which in fact
does beat a competing offer if the buyer has done nothing to initiate
the price break in the first place. '3 5 She added, however, that "to
hold that a buyer can escape liability merely by inducing and accept-
ing a second discriminatory offer which meets an offer previously in-
duced by the buyer would make a mockery of section 2 (f)."31 This
is not the first time that Robinson-Patman language has undergone
33 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADEREG. REP. at 21,308.
34See note 5 supra.
35 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 21, 312.
361d.
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surgery or repair in the interest of policy,37 and this may be one of
the less blameworthy occasions.
According to the majority's reasoning, the seller's meeting com-
petition defense would have defeated a section 2 (f) claim based on
mere "receipt" of a noninduced discrimination, but it afforded no
bar to a buyer liability claim based on "inducement." The issue of
what constitutes wrongful inducement thus became a crucial point
in the majority's analysis. Commissioner Jones began her discussion
of the inducement by noting that there was no need to establish
coercion of the seller. The element of inducement was satisfied by
a showing that the buyer had used its buying power in such a way
as to raise the likelihood of injury to its competitors. Commissioner
Jones found that Kroger wrongfully induced discrimination by bar-
gaining too hard. The Commissioner stated: "At some point ...
if the buyer continues to push, he must become liable if Robinson-
Patman bounds are exceeded." 38
In detailing the charges of hard bargaining, Commissioner Jones
referred to the false information given by Mr. Casserly to Beatrice
about the terms of competitive offers and also to his failure to con-
vey any correct information about them.3 9 In his dissent, Commis-
sioner Elman complained that this portion of the decision would
turn the Robinson-Patman Act into a truth-in-bargaining statute
requiring affirmative disclosure.40 Commissioner Jones' opinion,
however, is susceptible of limiting interpretations which render
Commissioner Elman's charge unjustified. First, Commissioner
Jones links her conclusion that Mr. Casserly's untruthfulness was
impermissible with a reference to Kroger's "very powerful bargain-
ing position,''41 perhaps leaving room for a smaller purchaser to be
a better poker player. Moreover, it is by no means clear that Com-
missioner Jones favors the imposition of an affirmative duty to dis-
close where the buyer has not, by his own misstatements, contri-
buted to the seller's confusion.
Having found that Kroger had satisfied the inducement element
of section 2(f) and disqualified itself from any benefit from the
37 See, e.g., Exquisite Form Brassiere, Inc. v. FTC, 301 F.2d 499 (D.C. Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 888 (1962), where the court rejected the Commission's reliance
on section 2's "frequent 'misfits in words and phrases"' and turned instead to statutory
policy.
38 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 21,312.
39 Id.
40ld. at 21,316.
41 Id. at 21,312.
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seller's successful meeting competition defense, the majority had to
deal with the remaining element of buyer liability - proof of the
buyer's knowledge that the challenged price was not cost-justified.
The majority found that Kroger had reason to know the Beatrice
offer was not cost-justified, pointing out that the evidence complied
with Automatic Canteen's42 reference to trade experience as a source
of proof of buyer knowledge.43  Commissioner Jones pointed to
Mr. Casserly's thorough knowledge of the dairy industry, and more
particularly to his experience with private label arrangements and
his investigations of conditions in the Charleston Division area in-
volved in the Beatrice negotiations. The Commissioner further
noted that one of the dairies expressly premised its withdrawal from
the bidding on the lack of cost justification for further cuts. The
hearing examiner had reached the opposite conclusion on the issue
of buyer knowledge, finding that Kroger did not have knowledge of
the dairies' costs and could have believed that substantial savings
would arise from the stripped service program.44
All in all, it appears that the Beatrice opinion takes a giant step
beyond Fred Meyer45 on the issue of buyer knowledge, and, if sus-
tained on appeal, will permit a great expansion in the use of trade
experience in establishing buyer liability within the doctrinal limits
of Automatic Canteen. Although the majority's strong emphasis
on the legal responsibility of large buyers for excessive pressure in
negotiations is welcome, the Commission's conclusion on the issue
of Kroger's knowledge of the absence of cost justification seems to
be based largely upon supposition and is far from satisfying. In
fact, it is difficult to escape the feeling that, in its treatment of the
distinct issues of inducement and knowledge, the Commission was
carrying water on both shoulders and hoping to compensate for a
relatively weak position on buyer knowledge by its strong criticism
of Kroger's bargaining techniques. It is certainly not difficult to
imagine that in a subsequent case in which the seller involved has
no meeting competition defense and the issue of buyer liability turns
on knowing receipt rather than inducement, evidence on the issue of
buyer knowledge which was no more persuasive than that in Beatrice
would be insufficient.
Sellers who sell pursuant to bids will take particular encourage-
4 2 Automatic Canteen Co. v. FTC, 346 U.S. 61 (1953).
43 See note 19 supra & accompanying text
44 [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG. REP. at 21,288, 21,312-13.
45Fred Meyer, Inc. v. FTC, 359 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1966), rev'd on other grounds,
390 U.S. 341 (1968).
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ment from the fact that the Beatrice decision means that price cuts
in bidding situations may, in appropriate circumstances, be justified
under the meeting competition defense. But the bidding in Beatrice
involved a great deal of negotiation and interchange of information
and views between the buyer and bidders. It is not clear what sig-
nificance the decision will have for bidding situations where the bids
are dosed and the buyer is closed-mouthed. It is to be hoped that
the generalized standard of good faith in Beatrice will permit the
seller to fix his bid on the basis of reasonable investigation of his
competitors' or potential competitors' bids in other recent bidding
situations, even though his information may be incomplete and he,
like Beatrice, actually beats the other bidders. As far as the close-
mouthed buyer is concerned, as long as he has not induced any of
the bidders to cut their prices, he should, under Commissioner Jones'
view, receive the benefit of the meeting competition defense claimed
by the winning bidder.
In conclusion, it should be noted that Caspar W. Weinberger,
former Chairman of the FTC, has stated that a reappraisal of Rob-
inson-Patman policy is underway at the Commission; however, pend-
ing such a reappraisal, Robinson-Patman enforcement will remain
vigorous. He has expressed the view that the greatest return from
Robinson-Patman enforcement "will probably be obtained by con-
centrating on inducement of anticompetitive discrimination. ,4 6  Re-
gardless of how the precise issues involved in Beatrice may be re-
solved on appeal, one can respectfully voice the hope that Commis-
sion enforcement under Chairman Kirkpatrick will carry forward the
more evenhanded treatment of seller and buyer responsibilities which
is evidenced in the Beatrice decision.
4 6 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP., No. 451, at A-21 (March 3, 1970).
